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Abstract:
The United Methodist Church is on the verge of what is expected
to be a primarily two-way schism. But the denomination is already rather
divided between seven main sub-churches: the global regions of Africa,
Europe, and the Philippines, and the four main ideological factions within
the United States (American traditionalists, the genuine Methodist middle,
institutionalist liberals, and liberationist progressives). Each of these subchurches has important internal divisions, but also distinct characteristics
setting them apart. Recognizing the particular features of each is crucial for
understanding how the coming schism will impact and is being prepared
for by different United Methodists.
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In 1985, the late sociologist Robert L. Wilson and now-Bishop
William Willimon, then both of Duke Divinity School, published “The
Seven Churches of Methodism.”
Their monograph boldly argued that the United Methodist Church
in America had developed seven distinct geographically based subcultures, to the point “that the United Methodist Church is not one church,
but seven” (1985:2):
The Yankee Church
The Industrial Northeastern Church
The Church South
The Midwest Church
The Southwest Church
The Frontier Church
The Western Church
The differences between these seven “churches” in the UMC were at
times so stark that Wilson and Willimon wrote that, in the immediate
context of hopes for growth, “[t]he contrast in expectations between some
congregations in Texas and in New England are so great that it is hard to
believe they are in the same denomination” (1985:14).
There are obviously limitations in making generalizations about
such broad groups of people. Nevertheless, it was a valuable, widely
cited study. Much of it remains helpful for understanding trends that have
continued across the subsequent three-and-a-half decades.
With the January 2020 announcement of the “Protocol on Grace
and Reconciliation through Separation” proposal (hereafter, “the Protocol”)
and now widely expressed support for it, the UMC is on the verge of a
widely anticipated formal schism, which many expect to primarily result
in two main denominations emerging, one more theologically conservative
and one more theologically liberal. However, even before such a split is
formalized, I contend that the denomination is already very divided, into
more than two key factions. In this paper, I show that while the number
of sub-churches is still seven, the most consequential lines of division
have become very different from those highlighted in 1985. As in Wilson
and Willimon’s study, there are extreme differences in the sizes of these
“churches” and important diversities and sub-divisions within each. This
paper will identify the particular characteristics of these seven main
factions within the denomination facing imminent schism. It is crucial to
understand the distinct realities of the UMC’s seven “churches” today in
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order to comprehend different ways in which the coming separation will
ultimately impact and is being approached by different United Methodists.
Geographic differences remain important, especially outside of
the United States. While each “central conference region”—as the UMC’s
governing Book of Discipline calls the central conferences of Africa, Europe,
and the Philippines (¶1311.6, Cf. ¶1704.2)—includes major ideological
and other divisions, addressed below, United Methodists in these three subchurches have largely stayed relatively more unified across at least their
theological differences. And the realities of international cultural, political,
and economic variations are such that two United Methodists in Germany
of different theological perspectives are likely to share many commonalities
that they do not share with too many Filipino or Congolese members.
For the United States, whose divisions have primarily driven us
to this point of impending “grace through separation,” it now makes more
sense to identify the four sub-churches that have distinguished themselves
along theological rather than regional lines: traditionalists, the genuine
“Methodist middle,” institutionalist liberals, and liberationist progressives.
Today, congregations in different parts of America who share an affiliation
with either the progressive, LGBTQ-affirming Reconciling Ministries
Network (RMN) or the evangelical Wesleyan Covenant Association (WCA)
are likely to feel a greater sense of spiritual connection with each other than
either is with any nearby United Methodist congregation perceived to be
“on the other side.”
While I readily admit my place among American theological
traditionalists, I have sought to be fair and accurate in this analysis.
Before individually discussing each of the seven “churches,” I will
outline some major, big-picture trends influencing all of them.
Two of the most powerful factors that have long shaped the UMC
are decades of unabated U.S. membership decline and the dominance
of the denomination-wide bureaucracy—the Council of Bishops, general
agencies, and U.S. seminaries—by people whose effective theologies and
ecclesiologies reflect American liberal Protestantism.
The first factor has greatly hurt morale within American United
Methodism, to the point that decline is often accepted as normal. Although
regional differences remain, the downward trend has spread across the
country. As a result, the pessimism which Wilson and Willimon observed
in certain U.S. regions has now become more dominant throughout
American United Methodism, while the optimism they observed in
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other regions has become confined to smaller sub-regions, exceptional
congregations, and a few visionary leaders. In 2017, Willimon recalled
how after his retirement as an active bishop, a church consultant evaluated
a Southeastern congregation, and concluded that none of its Duke-trained
pastoral staff had the skill sets to grow the church, adding “Worse, every
one of those clergy has a theology for why that’s OK!” (2017). Since 1984,
all five U.S. Jurisdictions have shrunk significantly, with the Northeastern
Jurisdiction losing over one-third of its clergy and laity, and the North
Central and Western Jurisdictions each losing over 40 percent (GCFA 1984;
Commission 2018).
Liberal dominance of the denominational hierarchy has remained
secure overall, despite some exceptions. In 1985, Wilson and Willimon
observed that Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary had “been a leader
in Christian social action” and “became deeply involved in the radicalism”
of the 1960s, resulting in “a credibility gap between the school and its
traditional constituency who felt that emphasis was not being placed on
training persons to serve as pastors” (1985:13). Today, a similar, widespread
credibility gap exists related to the left-of-center social action causes and
“prophetic” models of ministry often promoted at the denomination’s
American seminaries, not just Garrett.
While these factors are based in the United States, they have
global ripple effects when dwindling American congregations have less
money to spare for missions, American denominational officials arranging
partnerships supporting central-conference ministries have their biases, and
elite central-conference leaders come to America for seminary.
These factors have helped fuel one of the most dramatic changes
since 1985: the shift of membership (and to a more limited extent, power)
from America to elsewhere. Less than seven percent of delegates to the
General Conference held the year before Wilson and Willimon’s study came
from outside the United States, which helps explain their exclusive focus on
America (Journal 1984:24-85). That same year, the data available reported
less than half a million central-conference United Methodists, accounting
for less than five percent of the global total of 9.7 million (GCFA 1984). By
2019, the United Methodist News Service reported that U.S. representation
at the next General Conference will be down to 55.9 percent, that with
less than 6.7 million reported members, Americans’ “majority status
in The United Methodist Church is coming to an end,” and, that due to
incomplete records and lag times, we may have already passed that tipping
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point (Hahn 2019). Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for most of the growth in
central-conference delegates, skyrocketing from a token 22 delegates in
1984 to 278 now (nearly one-third of the total), although all three central
conference regions now send significantly more delegates (GCFA 1984;
Commission 2018).
These shifts have sparked tensions. Non-Americans have become
increasingly vocal in seeking a greater say in denominational leadership
and resource allocation, and in protesting being treated as children or
pawns. Yet besides General Conference, the membership shifts have not
been reflected in much of the denominational bureaucracy. For example,
for the denomination’s global social-justice agency, the General Board of
Church and Society (GBCS), less than four percent of its board of directors
are from Africa, fewer than those from the U.S. Western Jurisdiction,
despite the former being home to roughly half of all United Methodists and
including several times more people than the latter (GBCS n.d.). Liberal
Americans frustrated with most central-conference delegates’ theological
conservatism have sometimes responded by scrutinizing various American
subsidies for United Methodism overseas.
Wilson and Willimon predicted growing conflict over how Southern
Americans would want a greater say in denominational expenditures,
while, for the Northern Americans who then disproportionately dominated
the general-agency structure, “Those who became accustomed to making
such decisions will not relinquish their power willingly” (1985:20). Now
that General Conference votes have shifted overseas, those Americans
who were long accustomed to running the denomination have resisted
sharing, let alone relinquishing, their power. It is no coincidence that
many institutionalist liberal Americans (Church #3) abandoned previous
opposition to schism only after the 2019 General Conference showed they
were no longer as dominant as they had thought.
In the following pages, I will outline the distinctive features
and boundaries of each of the UMC’s seven main sub-churches today.
Importantly, for each of these “churches,” the constituency is far broader
than those who strongly support or feel represented by their faction’s
identifiable leaders.
Church #1: American Traditionalists
Since the release of the Traditional Plan eventually approved by
the 2019 General Conference (to maintain and ensure enforcement of
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previously enacted bans on “self-avowed practicing homosexual” clergy
and “ceremonies that celebrate homosexual unions”), “traditionalist” has
become a widely accepted label for those whose theology has been called
orthodox, conservative, and/or evangelical.
The Good News caucus emerged in 1967 to provide leadership
for this sub-church, long after Harold Paul Sloan’s “essentialist” movement
ended. In later years, Good News was joined by such newer caucuses
as the Institute on Religion and Democracy and its UMAction program,
Lifewatch, the Confessing Movement, and the WCA.
In late 1987, in a key milestone in the emergence of the Confessing
Movement, several traditionalist United Methodist clergy developed the
Houston Declaration. That manifesto defended “three crucial truths which
are essential to the life, witness and scriptural integrity of the church”:

·
·
·

“the primacy of scripture” as what the Confession of Faith of
the Evangelical United Brethren Church calls “the true rule and
guide for faith and practice”;
Traditional Trinitarian doctrine, along with “deplor[ing]” the
practice of “abandoning the name of God, Father, Son and Holy
Spirit or adopting inadequate substitutes”; and
Maintaining biblical disapproval of homosexual practice,
including by treating this behavior as unacceptable for clergy,
while also “repudiate[ing] all irrational fear of and contempt for
homosexual persons” (“Houston Declaration” 1987).

The second issue has faded as a prominent controversy. But the
first and third remain valuable summaries for what unites this faction. Most
American traditionalists want others to understand that they love members
of the LGBTQ community and do not see their own sexuality stance as a
primary value, but rather as derivative of more central commitments like
scriptural authority.
This group has long included exceptions to American United
Methodist pessimism about future growth possibilities. Pastors of many
of the largest American United Methodist congregations are firmly in this
camp. For the last several years, Dr. Len Wilson has examined American
United Methodist congregations with average worship attendances of at
least 1,000 and developed annual lists of the top 25 with the fastest growth
in attendance. Analyses of his lists have found a consistent pattern of a
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strong majority having theologically conservative senior pastors (Moran
2019).
This group has most acutely felt the aforementioned “credibility
gap” between church and seminary. While not an official UMC school,
Asbury Theological Seminary, with its commitments to evangelical
Wesleyanism and biblical inerrancy, has been an attractive alternative for
many traditionalist American seminarians, and has in recent years trained
many more United Methodist pastors than several of the denomination’s
own official, heavily subsidized seminaries. Its graduates are consistently
over-represented among the senior pastors of the fastest-growing large
congregations (Moran 2019). United Theological Seminary has in recent
years embraced Nicene orthodoxy and charismatic renewal, making it
rather exceptional among the UMC’s official American seminaries.
This faction shares with other American sub-churches some
anxiety over the decline of culturally encouraged church attendance. But
while Churches #3 and 4 below respond by urging the UMC to follow
the leftward trajectory of other “mainline” Protestant denominations
on sexuality morality and other matters, those in this “church” have
instead sometimes looked enviously at the greater numerical successes
and perceived faithfulness in more evangelical, non-mainline American
churches.
In early 2019, United Methodist Communications (UMCom)
released a national survey of American United Methodist laity, finding
a plurality of 44 percent describing their theology as “ConservativeTraditional,” compared to the 28, 20, and eight percent who instead chose,
respectively, “Moderate-Centrist,” “Progressive-Liberal,” and “Unsure.”
Chuck Niedringhaus, UMCom’s research director, warned against “add[ing]
the moderates and progressives and say[ing] that’s where the church is,”
because “[t]heologically, many (moderates) are more traditional” (Hodges
2019).
While the value of such undefined, self-chosen labels is limited,
the survey found key beliefs that set apart “conservative-traditional”
respondents. Most believe that “the only way to salvation is through a
relationship with Jesus” (86 percent), “believe in a literal hell” (82 percent),
and want the UMC’s primary focus to be “saving souls for Jesus Christ”
rather than “advocating for social justice to transform this world” (88
percent), while both progressive-liberals and moderate-centrists were much
more divided on these questions (UMCom 2019).
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Yet this “church” is not nearly as monolithic as sometimes
imagined. Rev. Dr. William Abraham wisely observed over two decades
ago, “The conservative wing of the church is itself a fragile coalition,
including those who lean in a catholic direction, those who are cardcarrying charismatics, those inclined in an Anabaptist direction, and those
who are really pragmatists at heart but for the moment lean to conservatism
out of convenience and traditional piety” (1988). Today, the unity of this
coalition may be somewhat less fragile, in part due to shared negative
experiences with unfriendly denominational officials and growing societal
hostility. And yet intra-traditionalist divisions remain, on the points listed by
Abraham as well as on such matters as ecclesiology and a number of social
concerns beyond sexual morality. It is worth emphasizing that this “church”
includes much greater diversity of opinions on American politics than many
outsiders assume.
Church #2: The Genuine Methodist Middle of America
This is perhaps the least understood “church.” After all, it is the
only one with no organized caucus or clear, representative leadership. This
group has become rather unrepresented among key denominational movers
and shakers, as a result of the generally more polarized culture within
the UMC and how elections of delegates to General and jurisdictional
conferences have been increasingly dominated by “slate voting” (the
practice of annual conference members, depending on their preferences,
voting only for candidates on lists disseminated by conservative or liberal
caucuses).
But there are many American United Methodists whose theological
views are truly somewhere in the middle of the denomination’s divides.
They feel uncomfortable with the packaged-deal stances of the caucuses of
the other U.S. sub-churches.
The details of what puts individuals in this sub-church vary widely.
Some Methodist middlers may sometimes strongly agree with conservative
caucuses and with liberal caucuses at other times, all on issues important to
them. Sometimes it is a matter of taking a position of genuine compromise
on key issues. One delegate once expressed to me support for the UMC
becoming more permissive on homosexuality, but also talked of feeling
“not yet ready” to go as far as changing the church’s definition of marriage.
Some in the other American “churches” may deem such middling
stances as unsettled or inconsistent. But that does not erase the fact that
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the views of significant numbers of United Methodists do not fit neatly into
any of the other factions. Even if being in this “church” often seems to be a
transitional phase before people make up their minds to “join” one of the
other factions, such personal evolutions can stretch over years.
At the local level, particularly among laity, the majority of members
have not paid too close attention to General Conferences, caucuses, or
others beyond their local congregation. The denomination’s growing
polarization may make such aloofness more difficult. But the majority of
American congregations also include mixes of perspectives, with members
previously not feeling too much pressure to “pick a side.”
When annual conferences and congregations eventually choose
to align with either a more liberal or a more traditionalist denomination, it
will be especially difficult for this group.
It is also important to understand that this group is very different,
and significantly less liberal, than the caucuses and leaders now prominently
embracing the “centrist” label.
Church #3: Institutionalist Liberals
This American sub-church is defined by (1) a strong desire to
liberalize church standards on sexual morality, (2) key theological shifts
needed to support this stance, and (3) loyalty to the institutional trappings
of the United Methodist Church as we have known it—the name branding,
hierarchies of leadership, and complex structure from our long history of
“organizing to beat the devil.”
In their own self-understanding, members of this “church”
resonate with all of the new UMC Next caucus’s “Four Commitments”:
Claiming continuity with the Wesleyan tradition, including
familiar United Methodist language referencing the four sides of
what others have called the Wesleyan quadrilateral and combining
“personal piety and social holiness”;
Affirming people of all sexual orientations and gender identities
as part of a larger framework of “resist[ing] evil, injustice and
oppression” and including people of all races, classes, abilities,
etc.;
Not only rejecting the 2019 Traditional Plan, but also “resist[ing]
its implementation”; and
Eliminating in church law teaching and standards expressing
disapproval of homosexual practice (UMC Next n.d.).

·
·
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The first commitment’s unelaborated use of the “social holiness”
buzz phrase, along with the second commitment, appear indicative of how
members of this “church,” like much UMC discourse in recent history,
has understood such values largely in terms of the left-of-center political
activism associated with organizations like the Methodist Federation for
Social Action. The repeated mentions of LGBTQ liberation, along with
careful observation of other statements from this sub-church’s leaders,
indicate that they see stopping the harm they view as inflicted on LGBTQ
persons as central to their theological understanding of the church’s mission,
in contrast to how American traditionalists tend to see sexuality standards
as derivative of more foundational values. The second commitment’s
language about staying in the UMC and fighting traditional standards from
within importantly sets this group apart from both Church #4’s willingness
to abandon the UMC to start a purely progressive denomination and from
those in the Church #2 whose own sexuality views are more liberal but do
not think it is worth fighting a pitched battle after General Conference has
made its decision.
Leadership is provided by the majority of American bishops,
denominational agency officials, leaders from older liberal-caucus
circles, and all of the newer caucuses describing themselves as “centrist.”
Sometimes those touting the “centrist” label and their close partners calling
themselves progressive have been characterized as different factions. But it
now seems more accurate to understand both as “institutionalist liberals.”
The self-described “centrist” caucuses, and some of their key leaders, can
be seen as relative newcomers now strengthening and assuming some
leadership of a liberal movement with a longer history. Several of these
newcomers are pastors of large congregations (some with impressive
growth records) and/or were formerly known as more traditionalist in their
theology before shifting. Some have track records of supporting key efforts
to reduce or reform much of the denominational bureaucracy, at times even
allying with American traditionalists in promoting greater representation for
regions with more members.
Given the confusion it has caused, it is probably best to retire use
of the word “centrist.” On the key dividing controversy over homosexuality,
every major caucus and leader touting this label has been adamantly onesided in pushing for liberalizing church standards as a central priority.
Furthermore, easily the most prominent “centrist” leader is megachurch
pastor Adam Hamilton. He has publicly agreed that “[t]he real issue for the
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church is not homosexuality, but the Bible” and framed his liberal position
on homosexuality as undergirded by viewing different parts of scripture
as divided into three buckets: those “that express God’s heart, character
and timeless will,” those that expressed God’s will only for a limited time,
and those “that never reflected God’s heart and will” (Hamilton 2014).
This “centrist” view of scripture is not terribly distinguishable from those
expressed within older liberal-caucus circles.
A brief historical review is warranted. The term “centrist” was not
widely used in denominational discourse until after an organization called
the “United Methodist Centrist Movement” was launched in West Ohio in
late 2014. That caucus initially named several concerns, but received more
attention in 2015 as it moved towards its apparent main goal of electing
fewer traditionalist General and Jurisdictional Conference delegates.
Evangelicals in the conference observed that this caucus eventually included
as key figures some who had previously been known as unambiguously
liberal, but then seemed to find the “centrist” label to be more marketable.
In 2017, leaders from this organization, Hamilton, and others launched a
nationwide “centrist” caucus called Uniting Methodists, primarily focused
on promoting liberalized church standards on homosexuality. At that time,
I carefully examined every founding leadership team member of this newer
organization for stances taken on other prominent controversies (abortion,
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the denomination’s social witness more generally,
the propriety of clergy violating the Discipline, and core doctrine on
matters like Christology). On each issue, I found some leaders with records
of strongly advocating a liberal stance, others who reputedly had more
conservative views but who had declined to help conservative efforts at
recent points of great denominational conflict over the issue, and not much
else (Lomperis 2017). Since then, I have observed that this basic analysis
remains true of every caucus and most leaders touting the “centrist” label.
Tellingly, in the mediation team that developed the Protocol, the two
initially selected to represent “the centrists” and the two initially selected
to represent supposedly distinct “progressives” were all members of the
Convening Team of Hamilton’s UMC Next caucus, including the current and
a former CEO of RMN, with a common legislative agenda (Reconciliation…
Team, “FAQ’S” 2020; UMC Next n.d.).
Leaders and activists of both this “church” and Church #1 have
often defined themselves in opposition to each other. They sometimes
emphasize that they are “not that kind of United Methodist.” American
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traditionalists have often understood their place as in large part defined by
rejecting what they see as the theological unorthodoxy, idolatrous loyalty
to the denominational bureaucracy, and, to a lesser extent, social liberalism
of institutionalist liberals. Institutionalist liberals have often understood
their place in large part as rising above what they see as the narrow
theological “fundamentalism,” destructive and disloyal undermining of key
denominational leadership structures, and retrograde opposition to social
justice among American traditionalists. Leaders of each have often claimed
that the denomination could become much more effective if only the other
faction would stop holding us back.
But just as William Abraham observed internal differences among
American traditionalists being held in check by the greater struggle within
the UMC, similar observations could be made about this sub-church. They
have done a remarkable job in recent years of maintaining a united front
against the traditionalists. But will such unity hold after the separation?
Time will tell.
Church #4: Liberationist Progressives
The self-described “liberationist” faction in America is sometimes
given disproportionate attention. It merits listing as its own sub-church
primarily due to speculations of some of its members forming a third
denomination. This possibility is explicitly provided for in the Protocol.
Until recently, leadership for this faction had been mainly provided
by the UM-Forward caucus, whose own plan (submitted before the
Protocol proposal was unveiled) would dissolve the UMC into four new
denominations: one for themselves, one for self-described progressives
who UM-Forward finds insufficiently progressive, one for moderates, and
one for traditionalists. They summarize their own potential denomination’s
identity as “grounded in Gospel-centered, anti-colonial, and intersectional
justice that intentionally empowers PoC+Q+T [people of color + queer +
trans] people” (UM-Forward n.d.).
Activists in this sub-church have made clear that even limited,
temporary toleration for clergy who decline to conduct same-sex weddings
is unacceptable. They have sometimes decried as a betrayal institutionalist
liberals’ push for the One Church Plan (OCP), which would have liberalized
church standards on homosexuality, with some protections to allow
conferences, congregations, and clergy to continue with a traditionalist
approach. (It is worth noting that traditionalist leaders critiqued these
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protections as insufficient, unsustainable facades, and that leading OCP
proponents abandoned support for even such limited protections after
the plan’s defeat at the 2019 General Conference.) Some in this “church”
have accused institutionalist liberals of prioritizing loyalty to and the desire
to maintain control of the denominational establishment over LGBTQ
liberation.
A May 2019 UM-Forward gathering produced a lengthy, multi-part
“Loved and Liberated” manifesto outlining their vision for the denomination
they want. Some noteworthy highlights include commitments to:
“reject gradualism and incrementalism” and accept “no
concession of any kind” to opponents of LGBTQ liberation;
prioritize “the fullness of the Gospel and liberative change” over
“denominational preservation”;
“create an expression of Methodism that is Christ-full and centers
PoC+Q+T voices and their lived experiences”;
“actively resist white supremacy, heterosexism, sexism, patriarchy,
transphobia, xenophobia, ableism, colonialism, classism, and
establishmentism”;
“dismantle[e] hierarchical structures”; and
have doctrinal standards that better “embody a theology of
liberation” (“Loved and Liberated” 2019).
With UM-Forward’s repeated allusions to a range of left-wing
social causes, seen as intertwined parts of an “intersectional” whole, this
“church” is probably the most politically monolithic.
It includes some General Conference delegates and prominent
activists. But it lacks the resources, prominent leadership, and naturally
aligned institutions of the first and third sub-churches. A review of the 100
largest-membership congregations in American United Methodism found
only one, The Gathering in St. Louis, formally affiliated with RMN (GCFA
2018; RMN n.d.).
Another problem for this “church” is that many of the grassroots
members whose values best fit into this group are among the biggest “flight
risks,” who may scatter away before any acceptably liberal Methodist
denomination is truly organized. A 2020 poll of clergy, lay leaders, and
voting lay members of the Indiana Annual Conference, the largest in the
North Central Jurisdiction, found 43.7 percent taking a liberal position on
“human sexuality,” and 27.9 percent saying they are not likely to remain in
the denomination if its position does not change (Lomperis 2020). While

·
·
·
·
·
·

Lomperis: The Seven Churches of United Methodism, Revisited 95

the latter figure indicates a potentially wider constituency for this faction,
it remains unclear how many will ever connect to UM-Forward or related
organizations.
A March 2020 UM-Forward conference was officially dedicated
to “Trailblazing the Liberation Methodist Church” but also was divided
between those eager to start a new denomination and those still hoping to
bring the greater UMC around to their vision (Hodges 2020). In late 2020,
this divide became formalized with two new associations emerging from
the UM-Forward caucus. The new “Liberation Project” is clearly devoted
to trying to win over a larger portion of the denomination to its liberationist
progressive values, in marked contrast to seeking to split off and start a
new liberationist denomination (Hahn, “Group” 2020). The Liberation
Methodist Connexion or “LMX,” on the other hand, describes itself as a
new “grassroots denomination of former, current, and non-Methodist faith
leaders working on the unfolding of the kin-dom of God” [sic], in which
they “intentionally invite the full participation of all who are living out
their God-given identities and expressions” in diversities such as “gender
expressions and sexual identity,” “religious or non-religious backgrounds,”
“heritage/nationality/citizenship/immigration status,” “monogamous and
non-monogamous,” and “use of drugs,” among other things (2020).
Despite this official dichotomy, it is unclear if the latter wing of
liberationist progressives will actually draw any significant numbers out into
a new denomination. I have not seen confirmation of a single congregation,
minister, or layperson actually joining the LMX, let alone the 100
congregations that the Protocol sets as the minimum size for any departing
faction to form its own denomination and have such rights as keeping its
church properties (Reconciliation…Team, “Protocol Legislation” 2020).
The organizers of this supposed “denomination” have pointedly refused
to say how many members or local churches they have, conveniently
telling the United Methodist News Service that “they do not want to equate
worth with volume,” and have even hedged their bets by talking about
continuing to work with like-minded United Methodists and “not asking
people to choose between” the UMC or the LMX (Hahn, “New” 2020). But
the UMC’s church law clearly forbids simultaneous membership in another
denomination, so that “[u]pon joining another denomination, membership
in The United Methodist Church is terminated,” which further limits the
LMX’s potential to realize its professed goals (UMC Judicial Council 1993).
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Furthermore, there are several more principled reasons that could
doom this faction’s ability to launch and maintain their own denomination.
If the Protocol passes and liberationists finally found themselves in an
increasingly liberal denomination that allowed same-sex unions and saw
numerous traditionalists part ways, the very goals for which they have
sought so hard for decades, how many would really take the trouble to
leave to start over? How sustainable will it be for the LMX’s leaders to
continue explicitly declaring that they have no doctrinal litmus tests
while at the same time being rather doctrinaire about certain core values
they see as non-negotiable social-justice causes? Given how this faction
is disproportionately led by LGBTQ activists and focused on LGBTQ
concerns, is the realistic ceiling of the LMX’s potential to become a niche
denomination primarily focused on an LGBTQ constituency? How would
it craft an identity clear enough to justify a separate existence from other
liberal denominations?
But then again, if the next General Conference fails to liberalize
sexuality standards or enact a separation agreement, then we could see
some current institutionalist liberals get frustrated enough to prepare to
leave to form their own denomination, thus having more in common with
the liberationists, rather than continuing to stay and fight. Especially in the
Western Jurisdiction, the aftermath of the 2019 General Conference saw
early signs of some now in the institutionalist liberal camp preparing to leave,
with a more liberationist progressive mindset, before the announcement of
the Protocol proposal.
Church #5: Sub-Saharan Africa
African United Methodism dates back to freed American slaves
settling in Liberia in the early 1800s (UMCom, “History…Africa,” n.d.).
Now this region has over 6.2 million members—a nearly 20-fold increase
from 1984—spread across 31 nations and three central conferences (GCFA
2017).
Making generalizations about such a large group can be
dangerous. Yet several broad outlines can be observed. United Methodists
are a major part of the religious landscape in parts of Africa, like Sierra
Leone, where they have been the largest Protestant denomination (Snider
2016). This sub-church tends to fervently cherish its United Methodist
identity and the cross-and-flame logo, in contrast to how some American
congregations minimize denominational branding.
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This region is severely under-represented in denominational
leadership. Yet it is the only one of the seven “churches” with strong,
consistent growth in this era. This has helped fuel optimistic expectations
for the church. In recent years, African leaders have become increasingly
vocal in seeking to set the denomination’s direction on sexuality, funding
priorities, and other issues, with much leadership provided by the Africa
Initiative, a newer caucus of African General Conference delegates.
African United Methodists are overwhelmingly theologically
traditionalist, with a high view of scripture, strong commitment to
evangelism, and near-unanimity in disapproving of homosexual practice
(often in much stronger terms than American traditionalists use). One
institutionalist liberal caucus admitted that “almost no” African delegates
voted for proposals to liberalize sexuality standards in 2019 (Holland 2019).
But American traditionalists should avoid taking an ultimately
dehumanizing, idealized view of African United Methodists. Such
“romantic racism” has an ignoble history. And disapproval of homosexuality
is a cultural default in most of Africa. In the majority of African nations
with a UMC presence, homosexual intercourse is outlawed in some way
(Mendos 2019:47-50, 139). Not all who accept their culture’s disapproval
of homosexuality are necessarily strong in upholding more contextually
counter-cultural or personally costly aspects of biblical morality. Similar
things could be said, to varying degrees, about United Methodists in some
other central-conference regions.
There are also some exceptions, which should be neither
ignored nor exaggerated. A few African General Conference delegates
have supported liberalizing proposals on homosexuality. U.S.-based
denominational officials have sometimes helped prop up unrepresentative
African leaders who are more amenable to liberal Western theology.
Furthermore, as the denomination approaches schism, one prominent
African leader has reported that “some influential African bishops, who
are in support or sympathetic to this progressive sexual ethic,” are seeking
to bring African United Methodism into the denomination that will allow
same-sex unions, at least in the United States (Matonga 2020). Sometimes
this appears to be driven less by principled support for gay rights than by
an institutionalist mindset of wanting to preserve connections with the
denomination’s branding and connectional structures, and judging that
this is worth remaining yoked with an American church with liberalized
sexuality policies, as long as those policies are not imposed in Africa.
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United Methodists here face vastly different social contexts,
internally and compared to other regions. African members have had the
most experience with interfaith relationships and conflict. Many have
lived through violent civil unrest. The infrastructure insufficiencies and
government corruption in some places can be difficult for Americans
to appreciate. Tribalism is often a powerful feature in social life, and
sometimes has been tied to painful, dramatic divisions in the contexts of
bishop elections and annual conference attempts to maintain a cohesive
identity.
Poverty is a major challenge. In 2019, the gross national income
per capita for Sub-Saharan African nations with a major UMC presence
ranged from oil-rich Angola at the highest with $3,050 to Burundi at a mere
$280 (ranking last among 192 nations). For comparison, America’s 2019
gross national per capita income was $65,760 (World Bank 2020).
Such disparities have fostered extreme and likely unsustainable
levels of dependency on American subsidies. One striking example was
the late Bishop John Yambasu of Sierra Leone estimating in 2017 that 95
percent of the salaries of his conference’s full-time pastors and evangelists
came from abroad, primarily from United Methodists in Germany and
central Pennsylvania (Jusu 2017).
For decisions about denominational standards and affiliations,
several African leaders have strongly declared the determination of
themselves and most other African United Methodists to never sacrifice
their traditionalist doctrinal values for the sake of American dollars. Yet
some other African leaders appear to be influenced by perceptions (for
which others have challenged the data) that the more liberal denomination
would have more money available to continue subsidizing Africa.
Another key characteristic is that African United Methodists are
generally accustomed to “big man” models of leadership, and the culture is
often more “rule of man” rather than “rule of law.” Thus, African conferences
tend to see more power and effective decision-making concentrated in
the episcopal office, with fewer checks and balances, than Americans of
any perspective would accept from their bishops. Relatedly, while central
conferences have a limited right to produce substantially adapted versions
of the Book of Discipline for use in their own contexts, this right does not
appear to have been exercised as widely and recently in Africa as in Europe.
Some of this can be attributed to prohibitive costs. But it also may reflect
a lack of felt need to publish permanent laws which could tie leaders’
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hands, when leaders are accustomed to simply deciding what is best, with
a broader range of discretion than in Western cultures.
Church #6: The Philippines
The Philippines Central Conference is much smaller, with three
active bishops and slightly more than 200,000 members (GCFA 2017).
While this is nearly a tripling in size since 1984, more recently membership
has faced stagnation (Commission 2018; GCFA 1984). It faces some similar
economic challenges as Sub-Saharan Africa, albeit to a lesser degree.
The overwhelming majority of the nation is Roman Catholic. Within the
Protestant minority, United Methodist congregations often struggle to retain
their younger people and do not reach the sizes of some of what are called
“the born-again churches” in their communities.
Yet much of this sub-church is rather mission-minded. In recent
years, Filipino United Methodists have planted congregations among
overseas Filipino worker (OFW) communities in other nations, including
the Islamic Middle East. One key leader of these efforts likes to emphasize
that they have done all of this “without asking for or receiving one dime of
American money.”
The denomination’s presence here began in 1899, right after the
Spanish-American War. Desire to not feel dominated by the United States
(the islands’ former colonial rulers) have fueled periodic movements for
autonomy. But the majority keeps remaining United Methodist (UMCom,
“History…Asia,” n.d.; Oconer and Asedillo 2011:269-277). In 2011, a
contested allegation against Bishop Lito Tangonan escalated to the point of
the bishop leaving to start his own denomination, with fights over church
properties spilling into lawsuits and even physical violence (Scott 2019).
By 2013, Bishop Tangonan had gotten over 200 congregations to join his
Ang Iglesia ng Metodista sa Pilipinas (AIMP) denomination (McLoughlin
2015:116). This was a significant defection, as the central conference
reported having just under 1,500 that year (GCFA 2013, n.d.). However,
some congregations later returned to the UMC.
Having already experienced multiple schisms since 1909
(UMCom, “History…Asia,” n.d.; Oconer and Asedillo 2011:275-277, 280),
even within such recent memory, makes talk of schism particularly loaded
for Filipinos. One denominational official has suggested that whatever
its immediate causes, the AIMP defection may have had the effects of
“siphoning off those pastors and churches that were most pro-autonomy
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and anti-UMC,” dampening of pro-autonomy sentiments among those
who remained, and making Filipinos leerier of any additional schism (Scott
2019).
Theologically, a strong super-majority of Filipino United
Methodists are traditionalist. This sub-church includes an active charismatic
renewal movement. However, in contrast to Africa, there is a sizable and
sometimes vocal theologically liberal minority. One major source of liberal
influence, on more foundational doctrinal matters than sexuality, is Union
Theological Seminary not far from Manila. Furthermore, the bishops are
in a different place than the majority of their people. Only Bishop Pedro
Torio, based in the northern city of Baguio, has consistently defended a
theologically traditionalist approach.
This central conference has a unique system of electing all three of
its bishops to renewable four-year terms. This has sometimes, though not in
all cases, encouraged a mindset that a district superintendents’ job includes
building their bishop’s political machine to help his always-approaching
re-election. I have been told that one main reason why Filipinos have not
exercised their right to make adaptations to the Discipline is all the time
at quadrennial central conference meetings that is sucked up by the three
bishop elections.
While the Philippines is allotted 52 delegates to the next General
Conference, Filipinos have generally not been as assertive as Africans
or Europeans in seeking to shape General Conference. The hundreds of
petitions submitted to the next General Conference by the regular deadline
included only four from Filipino groups or individuals, less than the number
submitted from people in the Norway Conference, with only three percent
as many members, (Commission 2018; DCA 2020: Section 1, pages 158,
163, 221, 222, 247, 325, 339, 371; Section 2, page 816). Of the over one
thousand petitions submitted to the last regular General Conference, the
record does not show one submitted from the Philippines (DCA 2016).
Furthermore, there is a widespread culture here of electing new delegates to
each General Conference. But the most effective delegates from elsewhere
are usually “veterans” who have served at several, thus building nuanced
understanding of the processes and connections with fellow delegates over
the years. Consequently, Filipino United Methodists do not have as deep
a bench of experienced, influential leaders who are widely recognized
beyond the Philippines.

Lomperis: The Seven Churches of United Methodism, Revisited 101

Church #7: The Central Conferences of Europe
Continental European Methodist history stretches back to close to
the beginning of Methodism, as migrants of various European nationalities
traveled to and from the New World. For leadership allotments, UMC polity
sometimes treats this region as a single constituency. Leaders from all four
of its episcopal areas have participated in cooperative efforts.
But the Discipline’s references to “the central conferences in
Europe” are not completely accurate. The Central and Southern Europe
Central Conference stretches into Algeria and Tunisia in North Africa. The
Moscow-based Eurasia Episcopal Area (one of two episcopal areas within
the Northern Europe and Eurasia Central Conference) stretches across Asian
Russia into the central Asian former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan.
And yet despite this long history now reaching across 30 nations,
today this region only counts slightly over 50,000 members, a number
which has been trending downward. With the fall of Communism, what is
now the Northern Europe and Eurasia Central Conference expanded into
Russia. But in recent years, none of its conferences has seen consistent
growth. The other two European central conferences have each lost over
one-third of their people since 1984 (Commission 2018; GCFA 1984;
GCFA 2009; GCFA 2013; GCFA 2017).
There are major differences in scale. Over half of members here
are in the Germany Central Conference. Each of the five annual conferences
of the Eurasia Episcopal Area has less than five hundred church members
(GCFA 2017). But their challenges of vast geography and government
persecution merit sympathy.
In 1985, Wilson and Willimon noted how United Methodism
“can feel very much like an isolated, minority movement” in much of the
U.S. Western Jurisdiction. The same can be said about this sub-church,
ministering on rocky soil with generally abysmal church attendance rates.
This has helped United Methodists here to value their identity as connected
to a larger, global denomination.
Internal divisions have often been generalized in terms of the
Western nations having greater wealth as well as theological liberalism,
and the Eastern nations often facing serious government repression and
financial dependencies. This is largely true.
But it is not that simple. In much of Europe, being any kind of
serious, church-going Christian is already so counter-cultural that it can
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foster deeper levels of commitment. So, the faith of some (though certainly
not all) United Methodists in very socially liberal Western European nations
can be rather theologically orthodox. At the same time, some theological
traditionalists in Western Europe judge such things as Americans supporting
Donald Trump or the National Rifle Association about as harshly as
heterodox doctrinal statements from liberal caucuses.
In contrast to Africa, each of the European central conferences has
a very accessibly documented, recent history of exercising its right to make
regional adaptations of the Discipline, with varying degrees of significance.
Notably, after the 2019 General Conference adopted the Traditional Plan,
the Germany Central Conference’s executive committee unanimously
endorsed a statement decrying this legislation as “not acceptable” and
declaring that their central conference “will therefore not follow the
chosen way of controlling people in their disposition and imposing stricter
penalties” (Ruof 2019). While such defiance might have been legally
challenged if not for the coming split, this reflects the dominant liberalism
among German United Methodists, to which there are some exceptions.
This region, particularly in wealthier Western nations, does not
have quite the same dependency issues as other central conferences. In
some countries, the UMC even enjoys government subsidies, along with
other religious bodies. In 2019, the annual conferences of all four European
episcopal areas contributed much more than their assigned apportionments
to support the Episcopal Fund (the global pool from which all bishops are
funded), and members in Germany and Central and Southern Europe did
what no other United Methodists outside America did: contribute more than
enough to cover their own respective bishop’s salaries (GCFA 2019:4; DCA
2020: Section 1, page 438). United Methodists in richer parts of this region
have subsidized poorer areas in the region, and also supported missions in
other parts of the world.
While civil law in much of Western Europe affirms same-sex
unions (Mendos 2019:144-146, 153-155), I am told that in at least the nonGerman central conferences, Europeans have not had the same experience
as Americans of liberal clergy publicly defying the denomination’s bans
on same-sex weddings. Thus, while many of the same theological divides
in America are present in Europe, United Methodists here have not gone
through the same level of polarizing controversies, mutual feelings of
betrayal, and alienation of affections that have been so key in laying the
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foundations for schism in America. This may make the coming schism all
the more difficult here when a time comes for “choosing sides.”
Concluding Considerations
A long-lasting theological civil war in the UMC has finally
reached a breaking point, so that some form of large-scale separation is
now inevitable. But while the main formal separation may be binary, some
major divisions are not. This paper has demonstrated how the denomination
is already divided into seven distinct major factions, each with important
differences from the others. Each is approaching and will be impacted by
the coming separation differently. And given the complexities of internally
diverse annual conferences having to pick one side, we can expect that
both of the two main denominations emerging from the split will include
members from at least several of the constituencies outlined above. The
success or failure of any denomination emerging from the split will likely
hinge on its leaders’ willingness and ability to understand such internal
differences in nuanced ways, clearly establish their denomination’s basis
and boundaries for unity, and make, in the concluding words of Wilson and
Willimon (1985:21), “its various parts organized to witness and to minister
most effectively.”
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